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**PHENOMENOLOGY AND BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY  
REFLECTION FOR “EMBODIED COGNITION”  
BY DŌGEN KIGEN AND MARTIN HEIDEGGER**

*ABSTRACT*

Contrary to Western philosophy, oriented to grasp and solidify the principles of essential being (*ontos on*), Buddhism seeks to understand the existence of human beings and the significance of suffering in human life. In East Asian languages human beings are described as inter-beings in that they are enveloped by the *topos* of life and death. Our life is bound to the moments of emerging and vanishing, being and non-being in an essential unity. Dōgen’s philosophical thinking integrated this conception with the embodied cognition of both the thinking and the acting self. In the phenomenological perspective, early Martin Heidegger emphasizes that being is bound to a fundamental substantiality which borders on the *Abgrund* falling into nothingness. According to Dōgen, the unity-within-contrast of life and death is exemplified in our breathing because it achieves a unity of body and cognition which can be called “corpus.” In a perfect contrast, the essential Heidegger’s reflection grasps the fundament of being in the world, which represents the actualization of a thinking-being-unity. The goal of this comparison is to grasp what is the essentiality of being, life, and recognition (*jikaku* 自覚), bounded to embodied cognition.

**Keywords:** embodied cognition, Dōgen, Heidegger, comparative reflection, philosophy in life.

**INTRODUCTION**

The historical position of Dōgen was the Zen Thinker. Dōgen Kigen (道元希玄) born in Kyoto 1200, died in Kyoto (Japan) in 1253, originated from a famous aristocrat family Koga (久我) with the childhood name “Monju” (文殊), lost his father in the early childhood, and also the mother at the age of 7. He was adopted by his uncle. Nothing was lacking in his material life, but he tended to melancholy while considering lifeworld in which suffering, depression or despair cannot be eradicated. At the age of 12 he spontaneously left his uncle’s residence. Transmitted by a relative who was a Buddhist monk, the young “Monju” entered into the monastery Hieizan-Enryaku-ji (比叡

山延曆寺) of the Tendai (天台)-Buddhism in Kyoto, one of the great Mahayana Buddhist Schools in East Asia. He was ordained to monk at the age of 13 with the *dharma* name “Dōgen” (道元). He met in the next year, 1214, Monk Eisai (Myōan Eisai 明菴栄西 Japan, 1141–1215), one of the greatest Zen Buddhists who widely introduced in Japan the Zen Buddhism from China. Eisai established in Japan the original Zen tradition from China, the Rinzai-School. Influenced by Eisai, Dōgen went to China (in the Era of Song 宋) in 1223 at the age of 23. Visiting and staying at various Chinese Zen monasteries he met the Zen Master, Tiandong Rujing /Tendō Nyojō (天童如浄, China, 1162–1227) one of the most relevant Zen Monks in China. In his finishing period of intensive Zen study, Dōgen was requested by his Zen Master Nyojō to stay in China. Dōgen came back at the age of 27 (1227) to Japan, where he tried to establish there a new school basing on the original Chinese Zen tradition, the Sōtō School (曹洞宗). Although Dōgen had jealous rivals his own tradition grew up continuously. However, there were always a number of problems concerning numerous rivals of another Buddhist schools. Involved by institutional political struggles against some groups of Tendai Buddhism, the established enormous organization which had connections with several politicians in the government, Dōgen decided to go out from the Kyoto to a provincial region. In the guidance of Hatano Yoshishige (波多野義重), one of the most trusted supporters of Dōgen, Dōgen’s community established a complete new monastery in the province of Northern-Western Japan; today, the Great Monastery Eihei-ji (永平寺) in the prefecture Fukui. “Shōbō genzō” [Reflections of True *dharma* 正法眼蔵] (“*Dharma*”, “The World of Universal Truth of Buddhism”) in 75 volumes and several appendix (12 further volumes and several appendixes), Dōgen’s main work was completed thought many years and finished in this monastery. After Dōgen’s death at the age of 53 (1253) his school and his works got from generation to generation an intensified acknowledgment in various areas in public and societies. Today, the Great Monastery Eihei-ji is one of the most important center of Zen Buddhism in Japan, East Asia, and in the world.

### THE POSITION OF EMBODIED TRUTH

Dōgen’s main work, *shōbō genzō*<sup>1</sup> [Reflections of the True *dharma* of Buddha] is composed in the style of typical Zen language. Due to Dōgen’s knowledge of classic Japanese and Chinese literature as well as his understanding of everyday language in China and Japan at that time, the original position

<sup>1</sup> Dōgen, K. 2004–2008. *Shōbō Genzō*, vols. 1–75 and others. Masutani, F. (Ed.), vols. 1–8. Tokyo: Kōdansha.

*Shōbō Genzō*. 1993. Essential vols. incl. the secret volume. Nakamura, S. (Ed.) Tokyo: Seishin shobō. Dōgen, Mizuno, Y. T. Terada. 1980. *Shōbō Genzō* (original vols. 1–75), vol. 1–2. Tokyo: Iwanami. For the biography of Dōgen in historic scientific research see Imaeda, A. 1994. *Dōgen*. Tokyo: NHK books.

of Dōgen's Zen thought has given rise to a unique philosophy, embodying truth in life. Dōgen's philosophy differs from Aristotle's *philosophia prima*. Among others, Aristotle maintains that *philosophia* has to grasp the causes of phenomena and beings. Things which are experienced should be subjected to analysis: "Why does this particular phenomenon appear?" The problems mainly investigated by Aristotle in his *philosophia prima* are not the experiences of truth *per se*, but analytical thinking which has to clarify the causes of phenomena and the principle by which the phenomena are constructed as a logical scheme.<sup>2</sup> The *theoria* for viewing an absolute truth must be realized through the *logos*, stating general truth in a logical language.<sup>3</sup>

Quite the opposite is the principle of Buddhist philosophy, which is positioned always in the *topos* of a phenomenon of experience in life. The most important is not the process of establishing a statement by *logos*, but grasping, acknowledging and demonstrating a universal truth dependent on one's own life, based on bodily existence. In short, cognition according to Buddhist philosophy has a principal preposition which should not be omitted or ignored. Cognition of every kind is focused on the centre of one's own life, in relation to real circumstances, a real environment, and also to the practice of daily life.<sup>4</sup>

Not only Zen practice but also life comprises a wealth of experiences to grasp a universal, irrefutable truth which is practiced and manifested day by day. Cognition, reached through the confrontations of daily life, is bound to the main aspects of the experience of an irrefutable, undividable truth. It must be experienced and actualized through one's own bodily existence. The complex system of truth is always constructed in the integration of one's own life, one's own action of thinking and acting, so that the bodily self within the real and the intellectual world overlaps with the construction of a dimensional truth in daily life.<sup>5</sup>

## 2. THE TANGENT OF ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY AND BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

In pure analytical thought the subjective self, its feelings, emotions, its sense of bodily existence etc. are omitted from cognition. These factors are, first of all, filtered in analytical consciousness, to divide everything into categories which can be evaluated and verified as positive, analytically correct scientific data. Buddhist thinkers acknowledge the relevance of analytical categories and

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle. 1987. *Metaphysik* Schwarz, H. (Ed.). Stuttgart: Reclam, vol. A (I), 981b.

<sup>3</sup> Klein, H.-D. 2005. *Metaphysik*. Wien: Literas, chap. VIII; *Geschichtsphilosophie*, Wien: Literas, chap. III.

<sup>4</sup> The full context of Dōgen Shōbō Genzō states this fundamental position. See especially vols. 身心學道, 現成公案, 佛性.

<sup>5</sup> Hisaki, H. 2014. "Cognition Embodied in Buddhist Philosophy." *Philosophy Study*, vol. 2012-4, New York: David Publishing.

value the significance of analytical thinking. In short, Buddhist philosophy works knowing this kind of analytical filtering, but independently from this, because the analytical filtering of every problem (and dividing what is analyzable and what is) does not result in tightening and limiting the thinking and acting dimensions. In natural science, a problem arises from observing and analyzing a problematical fact.<sup>6</sup> Namely, in a preparatory operation, the minimal parts are defined, and from those parts a larger entity is reconstructed. Even if the collected parts can be reconstructed, showing a functional unity of a system, the solution to any problems is found only in a selected part of the whole phenomenon, out of which new problems may arise unexpectedly. Buddhism focuses just on the following point: the analyzed factors are reconstructed to open up a whole dimension of truth which should be applied to life in the real world. Yet, analytical philosophy leaves many parts which cannot be clearly analyzed.<sup>7</sup> A part of the world is neglected, whereas the remaining analyzed part dominates in the image of the whole universe. Moritz Schlick, who occupied a prominent position in the Vienna Circle, states that the self, soul, psyche etc. which built up the metaphysical problem could be proved only by concrete positive, natural scientific facts, for example, in mutual communication and in the knowledge of persons in accordance (coherence) with the recognition of several data. Under these conditions acknowledging only the positive, scientifically verifiable facts is right, but something has been neglected in this discourse of criticizing and omitting “idealism”, “metaphysics”, “religious intuition” etc. This shows an aspect which should be cautiously reviewed by self-critical reflection: The unity of this “judging self”, which criticizes and isolates others, is seen in Buddhist philosophy as the most important problem. Here the object of a self-critical view is the “self *per se*”; at the same time, this “object” is the main “subject” of our thinking and of cautiously recognizing causal relationships.<sup>8</sup>

### 3. THE PHENOMENON OF SUFFERING

A position like that of Schlick is not valid in Buddhist philosophy because the latter envisages the phenomenon of suffering of every kind. The reason is quite evident: Buddhist philosophy works primarily with the questions: “What is suffering?”, “How can we overcome our own suffering?” Suffering is not

<sup>6</sup> Pietschmann, H. 2003. *Phänomenologie der Naturwissenschaft*. Berlin: Springer.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Pietschmann, H. “Drei Grenzen der Naturwissenschaften—Kritische Philosophie der Naturwissenschaft.” In: *Denkdisziplinen von Ost und West*. Hashi, H. (Ed.). The work will be published by T. Bautz.

<sup>8</sup> Schlick, M. 1986. *Die Probleme der Philosophie in ihrem Zusammenhang*. Frankfurt a. M., chap. 21, 22.

only physical pain, it does not only imply injuries of the body or psychic trauma. It is better to describe it otherwise, namely as follows. The term “suffering” in Buddhist philosophy includes all phenomena of dynamic change in every being, phenomena of one’s self and its circumstances, the dynamic change of the things between stability and non-stability. All those are topics in a life world, in which everyone experiences the transformation of one’s own mind, one’s own body as well as one’s own connection to other beings in the environment. The total phenomenon of dynamic change includes one’s own life, its bodily and psychic circumstances. They produce the causality of *duḥkha*, the suffering of various kinds, the complete phenomena of the problems of humans and other beings.<sup>9</sup>

If we define “suffering” by physical pain, the experience of suffering is hard for the sufferer, who will try to come out of suffering. At the same time, the suffering from that particular pain is not real for others persons. A physician, due to his medical knowledge, may imagine how intensive this pain is for a given part of one’s body. But generally the suffering of other persons, more generally other beings, cannot be experienced by someone else in the same way, at the same time, by the same causality, at the same level or in the same psychic situation. Ludwig Wittgenstein grasped this point in his *Philosophical Investigations* writing that the pain of one subject cannot be clarified at all, even if we have possibilities to describe and define it.<sup>10</sup> Physicians, too, can only form analogous conclusions on the kind of pain the patient is suffering. This circumstance that one can experience his/her own “suffering” exclusively within his/her own self, is the basic principle in Buddhist philosophy; it focuses all other problems. The main principle is that our life is bound to end at a “terminal”, namely, death. No one can experience the death of someone else. It causes a psychic confrontation and suffering, which Buddhist philosophy treats as the “*duḥkha*”—the form and contents of changing phenomenon at any time, any space, under any circumstances and in any situation in real life and in intellectual activity.

With regard to one’s suffering, we can see the following general phenomenon: If physical pain is correctly diagnosed and treated, the pain will be reduced; it vanishes at a given point of time. If this is true, the sufferer is not suffering any longer because the causality of suffering (the *dynamis* of the pain, in terms of Aristotle) has faded, the “substantial unity” of the painful part of the body (*energeia*, the realizing, in terms of Aristotle) and the relation linked to its causality do not exist anymore. It is hard to substantialize what suffering is, especially in the midst of experiencing it. Physiologically, the overstimulated

<sup>9</sup> Takasaki J., Hayashima, K. 1993. 仏教・インド思想辞典, articles of 苦 (suffering), 無常 (instability), Tokyo shunjū-sha.

<sup>10</sup> Wittgenstein, L. *Philosophical Investigations*, articles 253, 257, 286, 288, 289, 310. The similar problem of the relation of the experience of feeling and knowledge is considered by Thomas Nagel, in: 1997. *Analytische Philosophie des Geistes*. Bieri, P. (Ed.). Weinheim.

nerve in that part of the body transmits the information about a danger as a series of electron signals from the damaged part to the central nerve system and to the cerebral cortex. This process is very fast, causing a drastic change in the mental and physical conditions. In psychic injury and trauma this situation can be intensified: only the person whose psyche was injured suffers his/her own trauma. The phenomenon of the trauma treated properly will become obsolete in the memory and vanish. Pain and suffering cannot be definitively substantialized; even if this phenomenon is defined in medical and physiological terms, the struggle of overcoming pain and suffering will always be part of a person's own experience.<sup>11</sup> A thing or a phenomenon is executed completely and vanishes in time and space without any "substance": The "substantiality" has been interpreted in Western philosophy as a remaining entity actualizing every changing phenomenon which is acknowledged as an "eternal truth". In Buddhist philosophy the remaining entity is *dharmā*, universal truth, which is experienced, recognized and actualized in our bodily life. *Dharma* as the "eternal truth" cannot remain substantial because the phenomenon including our self and our environment is always transformed from one state to another one.<sup>12</sup>

In that sense, Buddhist philosophy is not a mysticism; it is without enthusiasm, esoteric features and irrationality. Since Buddhist and Zen practice were first introduced in Europe under the slogan of "Zen and the Mysticism of Christianity", this connotation has been widely disseminated via the mass media. We should, however, bear in mind that Buddhism as a philosophy shows rational thinking in immediate relation to our real life.

#### 4. BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

Contrary to analytical philosophy, Buddhism and phenomenology present several similar basic ideas of thinking. One of these similarities is that they both are based on phenomena. In contrast to the transcendental philosophy of Kant, they question primarily what "*quid facti*" is, but not what "*quid juris*" is.<sup>13</sup> Cognition in Buddhist philosophy is never separated from the real phenomena in the empirical world. This point of view enables us to compare Dōgen and Heidegger thinking. Heidegger postulates that phenomenology is a method of

<sup>11</sup> Masatake Morita, in his *Morita Therapy*, stated this relation of reducing and eliminating "suffering" found in neuro-psychic symptoms, with the purpose of an effective support to strengthen the self-healing capacity of a patient. Tashiro N. 2005. *Morita Ryōhō nyūmon* [Introduction to the Morita Therapy]. Tokyo: sōgensha.

<sup>12</sup> Hashi, H 2011. "Dr. Morita's Psychophysical Therapy and the Way It is Influenced by Zen Buddhism." In: *Globalisierung des Denkens in Ost und West*. Wallner, F., H. Hashi (Eds.). Nordhausen.

<sup>13</sup> Kant, I. 1990. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B 116–117, A 84–85. Schmidt, R. (Ed.). Hamburg: Meiner.

investigating which shows itself openly, and which is obvious in itself. His phenomenology is expressed by a maxim “to the things themselves!”<sup>14</sup>

Instead of a speculative deduction of categories, his thinking in *Phenomeno-Logos*<sup>15</sup> tends to reflect what is essential being hidden in the background of the phenomena. Even if Heidegger says so his position is a phenomenological analysis of being; his way of thinking grasps the essential being in view of the whole **problematical** phenomena. If the analysis of anxiety is executed, anxiety is not only an analyzable category, but is also in the focus of the phenomenon of the human being who feels an anxiety.<sup>16</sup> Thinking in connection with feeling and atmosphere, the so called “*führendes Denken*,” one of the well-known key concepts of Heidegger’s research<sup>17</sup> sets a basis for understanding the phenomena of the Buddhist and East Asian philosophies in which the levels of feeling and thinking are integrated without being opposed.

Let us view Buddhist thinking. For Dōgen, reflection leads primarily to transparent cognition transcending our self and the limit of our knowledge (in the terms of Dōgen: *tōdatsu* 透脱)<sup>18</sup>, in which we see the fundamental cause of our suffering and the confusion or the problems of our tangible life. For Dōgen, the ultimate purpose of thinking is to use it as a means of transcending our reliance on thinking in order to more fully harmonize with eternal truth (*dharma*). Independent from speculation, the Buddhist law of eternal truth, *dharma*, is to grasp the phenomenon of tangible life. Sensory perception is not secondary, attached to cognition, because knowledge—as cognition is integrated with bodily existence—is the primary source in Buddhist philosophy of the thinking-recognizing-acting-system of *dharma*—eternal truth viewed from an extended spectrum of historical and contemporary thought in critical and self-critical reflections.

As Heidegger said, “To the things themselves!” (cf. footnote 14), the reviewer approaches things, grasps and construes the basic way of being in *Phenomeno-Logos*. The method is oriented to collecting things from phenomena and exhibiting them in the language of logos (*legein*).<sup>19</sup> The viewer is primarily the thinking one who is able to state what is the fundamental principle of being throughout all phenomena.

<sup>14</sup> Heidegger, M. 1993. *Sein und Zeit*. Tübingen, § 7, 27; English translation: 1962, by Macquarrine, & Robinson, 50. Cf. Rombach. 1980. “Das Phänomen Phänomen.” In: *Neuere Entwicklungen des Phänomenbegriffs*. Freiburg.

<sup>15</sup> Heidegger, M. 1993. *Sein und Zeit*, op. cit., 27; *Being and Time*. 1962, op. cit., 49–50.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, § 53; in English version. 1962, op. cit., 311.

<sup>17</sup> Heidegger, M. *Führendes Denken, Problem der Angst*, op. cit., § 29, § 40, § 38, §46 –§53, § 62, § 67, § 68.

<sup>18</sup> Dōgen, *shōbō genzō*, vol. 全機.

<sup>19</sup> This expression has a source in Heidegger’s explanation of the origin of “Logos,” the verbum λέγειν, sagen, sammeln. Heidegger discussed the relevance of the “legein” especially in: “Der Satz vom Grund,” 13. Vorlesung. In: *Gesamtausgabe*. 1997. Bd. 10, Frankfurt a. M., 253. Hashi, H. 2012. *Kyoto-Schule – Zen – Heidegger*. Wien, 162.

According to Dōgen, a viewer is a thinking and acting person in daily life. Life is a phenomenon where we seek to grasp what truth is.

Let us summarize the relation between phenomenology and Buddhist philosophy. Buddhist philosophy has a tangent to cognitive science to clarify what is pain; on the other hand, it has a tangent to philosophical anthropology to clarify what is the self and self-subjectivity and what is suffering. Buddhist philosophy strives for a system, a complex system of knowledge by which our experiences in life and in the intellectual world are always integrated.<sup>20</sup> As regards the firm connection of philosophical knowledge to the phenomena of the world, Buddhist philosophy occupies a position highly similar to phenomenology or phenomenological ontology.

### 5. PHENOMENOLOGY AND BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY —VIA THE COMPARATIVE THINKING METHOD

In the philosophy of both Heidegger and Dōgen, the core is the phenomenon of the world, especially because to Dōgen life in time and space is surrounded by all things in the environment. For that reason, Heidegger and East Asian thinking including Buddhist philosophy often are regarded to be similar. Buddhist philosophy as well as other East Asian thought systems were interpreted by Western philosophers in view of their similarity to Heidegger. Surely this was an important step in the development of intercultural philosophy in Europe from 1980 onwards. However, in the effort to link Heidegger to Buddhist philosophy several problems should be considered, mostly in the view of comparative philosophy.<sup>21</sup>

One of those issues consists in that Buddhist philosophy closely connects knowledge and its actualization in real human life. Thinking is an intellectual part of the actualization of life. The topos of thinking and acting as the *actus intellectualis* is always accompanied by objectivity with the aim to overcome/transcend one's own subjectivity. This is a basic principle for understanding Buddhism, especially for understanding what cognition and knowledge means in this philosophy. Experience and knowledge are incorporated into one's mentality, bodily existence and into the thinking system of the one who experiences. Our personal self is a corpus seen as a dimensional body into which we can transfer our cognition, which is applied and actualized in contacts of the self with others, and by the self with its environment. Without this close connection between intellectuality and acting in a lifeworld, no cognition is

<sup>20</sup> Hashi, H. 2014. *Philosophy Study*, vol. 2014-2. New York: David Publishing.

<sup>21</sup> For potential harmonizing, similarity and unity see Ohashi R., G. Stenger (Eds.). 2013. *Heidegger und Ostasiatisches Denken*. München: Alber. Several problems arising from this similarity are remarkable in the light of comparative philosophy: Hashi, H. 2012, op. cit., main section III.



possible according to Buddhist philosophy. Embodied cognition is the principle which strives for establishing an intelligible self in a lifeworld.<sup>22</sup> Thus, the characteristic of Buddhist philosophy is that cognition must be embodied.

### 5.1. Formal Similarity—“Lightening and Hiding”, “Er-eignis”, “Gelassenheit”

Let us view some important points of a comparative reflection of Dōgen and Heidegger.

Heidegger has shown the relevance of feeling thinking in the *Sein und Zeit*. The “lightening and hiding”<sup>23</sup> in *Being and Time* is remarked by interested interpreters in accordance with the theory of the relationship of yīn and yang in Taoist philosophy. Also the “*Gelassenheit* (calmness) *equanimity*” in his late work, “where thinking stops in its border, the true thinking begins” could be accompanied by the Taoist thought of Laozi and others.<sup>24</sup>

Surely, several phrases of the late Heidegger hint his connection with Buddhist philosophy. It is desired to research in details, if and how far Heidegger’s thoughts and Zen Buddhism are in a harmonious equality. The most important aspect to clarify is semantical one since their original thinking systems are construed from quite different perspectives and viewpoints, and, first of all, based on different principles of the subject-object-construction of logic.<sup>25</sup>

The basis of Dōgen’s thinking is 1) the experience observed in the cautious, self-critical view of the experiencing self, 2) grasping universal truth and 3) actualizing this truth through one’s bodily existence in life. The experiencing self perceives and comprehends the dimensional world of truth step by step, viewing the phenomena encountered by it in its life circumstances and environment. The problem is intensified specifically with regard to the questions: “What is our self?”, “What is truth in our world of empirical life?”, “How can we express and actualize universal truth in a real world?”

Heidegger sees the main principle of approaching dimensional truth through the experience of daily life from another position: He wants to understand the sense of Being. For example, Heidegger in his late work looks cautiously at the aspect of the “*Er-eignis*”<sup>26</sup>, the occasion, a special happening in the empirical

<sup>22</sup> For this position in accordance with the terms of “*actus intellectualis*,” “*corpus*” see Hashi, H. 2012, op. cit., footnote 21.

<sup>23</sup> Heidegger, M. 2007 [1962]. *Zeit und Sein*, In: *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 14. Frankfurt a. M. Klostermann.

<sup>24</sup> Heidegger, M. 1960. *Gelassenheit*. Pfullingen: Neske.

<sup>25</sup> Izutsu, T. 1986. *Philosophie des Zen-Buddhismus*. Hamburg: Rowohlt, chap. I.4; Hashi, H/ 2013. “Comparative Thinking as a Fundamental Method for Interdisciplinary Research, *Journal for Communication and Culture*, vol. 3, no. 1, Spring, 5–2, chap. 2.1. Institute for Communication and Culture E-ISSN & ISSN-L: 2247-4404. www.jcc.icc.org.ro

<sup>26</sup> Heidegger, M. 1990. *Identität und Differenz*. Pfullingen, 24f.

phenomenon in which Being per se arises very intensively. Man (in German: one, someone) becomes aware of grasping the fundamental ground of Being. Other moments in which Being /*Dasein* is not enlightened and clarified are not considered. The *Sein*, the essential being, goes on into the phenomenon of “hiding” (*Verbergung*). Early Heidegger includes it as “*Verfall*” (falling down) and “*Zerstreuung*” (splitting) of the essential cognition into the phenomenon of the triviality of daily life.<sup>27</sup> The main focus is directed to the clarification of the concept of the essential being, *Sein*. Even if the concept of the “*Er-eignis*” concerns the occasion of the arising and encountering of the fundamental ground of being, the embodying of the recognized did not become a special topic of his phenomenology.<sup>28</sup>

## 5.2. The “Self”, the Recognition, Awareness and Actualizing of Experienced Truth

Heidegger maintained a critical distance to Kant’s transcendental category of the “*Ich denke* (I think) as a pure formality of the thinking activity of a self, primarily because being in the world in a phenomenon of a person; his/her temporality and feeling etc. were not investigated.<sup>29</sup> Instead of the abstract transcendentalism of the “I think,” Heidegger stated the necessity of the concretization of “I think something” (*Ich denke etwas*).<sup>30</sup> This kind of concretization appears in the whole *Being and Time*; thus a similarity of Heidegger and Buddhism is revealed. But the following aspect distinguishes the phenomenological *Daseinsanalyse* of Heidegger and Dōgen’s *Zen Buddhist Philosophy of Life*. Heidegger sets and concretizes the problem by the viewing the whole phenomenon (sometimes also including the lifeworld) from the methodological position of *Dasein*-analyse. He built up a unique position of phenomenological ontology, but he is not in the position of the awakening of the self in bodily life, the transcending of its own limit of knowledge, its achievement of the transcending cognition for an intelligible self.

For example, man for Heidegger is a person who is found in a phenomenon of the world.<sup>31</sup> It is focused from the cautious observer’s viewpoint of Heidegger as a phenomenological thinker and analyst of *Dasein*, but is not present in the general position of Dōgen and Buddhist thinkers. The latter approach the problem from the “middle of experiencing the things in a life of the bodily self,” just within the topos of the “experiencing one,” the experiencing self

<sup>27</sup> Heidegger, M. 1977. *Sein und Zeit*. Frankfurt a. M., § 68, c, 458, 459.

<sup>28</sup> This paragraph is based on the new research for *Er-eignis-Denken* of Heidegger. See Hashi, H. 2004. *Die Dynamik von Sein und Nichts*. Habilitationsschrift im Gesamtgebiet Philosophie. Frankfurt a. M. IV.1.2. Idem, 2001, 2004. *Was hat Zen mit Heidegger zu tun?* Wien, 68–69; idem. *Kyoto-Schule – Zen – Heidegger*, part. II, 165, part III.7, 181–229.

<sup>29</sup> Heidegger, M. 1977, op. cit., § 64.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 425.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., § 25–27.

with the purpose of recognition in a cautious view, far from any subjectivity, whereas the recognized truth has to be actualized as an embodied cognition in a lifeworld.

### 5.3. Some Principles in the Buddhist Ontology—Towards the System of Philosophy in a Life World

I have shown a fundamental difference between the thinking principles of Heidegger and Dōgen. As a third point, I would like to discuss the different principles grasping being and non-being. A central point is that in East Asian Buddhist philosophy there is not a fundamental principle of defining being as a substantial, eternal fundamental truth in thinking and acting.<sup>32</sup> The negation of being, i.e. non-being, nothingness, emptiness (*śūnyatā*)<sup>33</sup>, absolute nothingness, the *mu* and so on<sup>34</sup>, construct an enveloped principle of eternal truth: God as a creator is not a topic in Buddhist philosophy. *Dharma*, the invisible system of the metaphysical and empirical orders, is understood as an absolute one, but it is a system of order and its relations, which can be described only through many predicates in addition to the subject, *dharma* as a non-personalized absolute *per se*. It is remarkable that Buddhist philosophy focuses always on a reality in an environment. Time and space are always bound to situations in which various relations are in interaction and co-existence and relationship.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>32</sup> This paragraph remarks that the syntax, semantics and semiotics of “Being” are in connotation of absolute positive significance in the history of occidental philosophy. This fundamental position must be at first recognized and distinguished affirmatively and productively by the interpretation of the same word in Buddhist philosophy (in Sanskrit *bhāva*, in Chinese/Japanese/classic Korean 有), while the latter has a completely other meaning and its own significance in the history of its development:

The being 有 does not correspond to the absolute truth. Furthermore, it is used constantly together with its contradiction and negation (non-being): being and non being, *bhāva* and *abhāva* are coupled in the terminology of Buddhist philosophy. Neither *bhāva* nor *abhāva* alone show the eternal truth of *dharma*: Both are bound to the phenomenon of *dharma*, whereas being and non-being are both in a relationship. Nāgārjuna, *Mūla Madhyamaka Karikā*, Chap. 15. In this fundamental position the equivalent position of the absolute truth which is bound to “being” / “Sein” is a irrefutable principle for Aristotle or Heidegger etc., but it is hardly found in Buddhist philosophy. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, vol. Γ, 1003a–1012b; Heidegger, M. 1977. *Sein und Zeit*, op. cit., chapters 1, 2, 3, 4; 9, 13, 14, 69 etc.

<sup>33</sup> Nāgārjuna, *Mūla Madhyamaka Karikā*, cf. chaps. 15, 25, 23, 21, 3, 2.

<sup>34</sup> Izutsu, T., 1977. *Toward the Philosophy of Zen Buddhism*. Teheran; 1986. *Philosophie des Zen-Buddhismus*. Hamburg: Rowohlt; Hashi, H. 2009. *Zen und Philosophie*. Wien, main section I.

<sup>35</sup> These aspects are central for the understanding of what Buddhism is and to distinguish it from other Asian religions, even if in the sutras of early Buddhism (*samyutta nikāya*, *digha nikāya*, *maḥjima nikāya*) there were not concrete technical terms to define what *anitya* (instability), *dukkha* (suffering) or *anātman* (non-ego, non-self) is: Cf. Steinkellner, E. 2002. “Zur Lehre vom Nicht-Selbst (*anātman*) in frühen Buddhismus.” In: Figl, J., H.-D. Klein. 2002. *Über den Begriff der Seele*. Würzburg: Königshausen-Neumann. See also Saigusa M, 1986. 仏教と西洋思想, Tokyo, 142ff. See the concept of “*dharma modāna*” (symbol of Buddhist cognition *dharma*) in: Takasaki, Hayashima (Eds.), 仏教・インド思想辞典, article 法印.

### Excursus 1:

Being, eternity, and God are not treated here in a careless mixture. This paragraph remarks executively the basic condition of thinking of different cultures. For example, the syntax, semantic and semiotic of “Being” are bounding to a connotation for a most affirmative, absolute positive significance in the history of occidental philosophy. This general base is prepositioned already—without any explanation by every starting point of thinking. The fundamental preposition for “Being” of this kind is not valid just by viewing and grasping the Buddhist philosophy in general. In comparative philosophy, especially in the case of treating different thinkers from different cultures, it is generally expected and also noteworthy that readers must come out from the frame of the historical interpretations of those thinkers just to be free of any preposition and prejudice which was built up in a long history of a certain culture. If one would ignore this starting position, every discourse goes into a labyrinth whereas readers or interpreters presuppose and prejudge a certain thinker from different backgrounds of different cultures. Comparative philosophy offers a new ground to reflect basic principles and prepositions which are prerequisite and bounding one to his/her own culture and thinking method. Just to this aim thinkers and readers are invited to an open cote for a new common ground in thinking and reflecting philosophical questions. (If one will ignore this starting point he/she will enter into a “field of isolation.” In executing this inter-action one can enter into a productive “field of intra-relation.”)

Time goes always forward, it does not turn back; an occasion which happened in the past is not reversible. Nothing is reversible in reality, time is bound to space in which humans execute various *karman* (the logical order of the causality and result of one thing which is related to another thing). Everything changes dynamically and does not continue forever; this is *anitya*, the negation of an eternal substantial being and its consistency, the main principle in Buddhist philosophy. Nothing remains substantial in reality; this principle is not changeable. Paradoxically, Buddhist philosophy places this principle of *anitya*, the principle of inconsistency, the negation of eternal being, as first in its metaphysical and empirical ontology. *Dharma* remains consistent, but it is manifested always through a human or being who, inherently, is never consistent.

### Excursus 2:

If someone thinks in a frame of occidental philosophy that “nothingness” can never be positioned in equality of “being”, he/she raises a barrier for productive thinking in comparative philosophy because this presupposition is derived from the historical background where “nothingness” was less valued or rather isolated in occidental philosophy. I avoid using the term of “Nothingness”, because it gives rise to a misunderstanding in the above-mentioned cultural

background. Originally, “*śūnyatā*,” the “emptiness” in syntax corresponds in its semantic meaning to an unlimited oneness without substantiality. In its further connotation in semiotics it suggests a widely open dimension for reflecting something which enables a fundamental ground of being and non-being, emerging and vanishing of everything in every relation, whereas the emptiness itself is neither limited by being nor by non-being. The syntax, semantic and semiotic connotation of “being” which is usual and common in occidental philosophy must be completely changed in order to understand Buddhist philosophy.

“Metaphysics”<sup>36</sup> has an original meaning in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, which was written and published after “*ta physica*”. The post-physical script research the causality of all things (*Metaphysics*, vol. Great Alpha, 981b). A similar examination was executed by Nāgārjuna, a logician and metaphysician of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy, in his main work “*Mūla Mādhyamaka Kārika*”, but it is based—as mentioned above—on the principle claiming that the source of the origin of all things is not God, not the Absolute One, based on substantiality or substratum, and also neither being nor non-being, whereas the emptiness as an unlimited dimension can envelop both being and non being: this is the core of attributes of *śūnyatā*.

## 6. THE PROBLEM OF LIFE AND DEATH

### 6.1. The Relation of Life and Death for Heidegger—Being and Time

The key concept of being there for death is the focal point of Heidegger’s discourse. He states that after the end of our lives there will be a dimension of death. There is a linear, finite development inherent to life, necessary for us to reach the totality of our existence in the world. The terminal point is death. Death appears as the loss of being. Even if the focus on the *Ab-grund* or nothingness<sup>37</sup> in the recognition of passing time seems to be similar to the Buddhist cognition of *anitya*, it is clear that time for Heidegger, also being and self are bound to the substantial existence associated with eternal cognition.<sup>38</sup>

Is, as Heidegger asserts, our existence in the world a constant journey towards death in a finite series of “not yet” moments? Is death a termination of

<sup>36</sup> In view of the historical development of Buddhist philosophy, its ontology in the sense of *meta-physica* and logics, and also the theoretical and practical philosophy in the critique of Heidegger against the metaphysics of European and Occidental philosophy should be separated from the subject of this article.

<sup>37</sup> Heidegger, M. 1993. *Sein und Zeit*, op. cit., § 47; *Being and Time*. 1962, op. cit., 280–281. Cf. The statement of Heidegger: 1943. “Da-sein heißt: Hineingehaltenheit in das Nichts.” In: *Was ist Metaphysik?* Freiburg: Klostermann

<sup>38</sup> Vetter, H. “Zum Wahrheitsbegriff bei Heidegger” will be shortly published in: *Denkdisziplinen von Ost und West* by Traugott Bautz-Verlag, series “libri nigri,” vol. 39.

existence, and is being in life something incomplete? Heidegger discusses these problems and shows that our existence is a “not-yet” to death. For Heidegger, death is still beyond all phenomena; it has not yet been included into the problem of being. Heidegger indicates a successive coming-into-being to arrive at the end; the impending death of our being. The problem of death for Heidegger is included into existence. Being thrown into the field of imminent death causes fear. Fear of death is integrated into being-in-the-world. Since the subject of fear is present even in our being-in-the-world, we may say: “*Angst ängstet sich*” (fear is afraid).<sup>39</sup>

Heidegger is concerned with the question of to what extent this nameless fear can be overcome. In his early works, such as *Being and Time*, he arrives at the conclusion that through encountering the void-ness of the existential *Abgrund*, one tries to overcome existential fear, and creates a possibility of finally becoming oneself, primarily through “an impassioned freedom towards death” having finally broken away from the illusions of self, factuality, whereas fear and anxiety could not be completely eliminated. He emphasizes the recognition of our being in a decisive view that this life is not necessarily independent of anxiety. This position shows a confrontation with the dichotomy of life and death.

## 6.2. The Relationship of “Time-Space-Consciousness” of Heidegger and Dōgen

The principles of the relevance of reality and the empirical world of life, the principle of the negation of a substantial being, the focusing on life and death, as seen by Dōgen, are fundamentally different than in Heidegger’s views. Heidegger treats the problems of *Nichts* (nothingness) in his first lecture at the University of Heidelberg: “Nothingness is hidden or ignored in Western philosophy, but it is remarkable in the world. Where the category of being shows a border of its possibility of consistency, there occurs an unknown dimension of *Nichts* (fall down into nothingness).”<sup>40</sup> In the *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger shows that our life is bound to the temporality in which everything is limited by passing time. At a point of time, things fall down into an *Abgrund*, into an underground of negated being. Only the cognition of being can resist against this constant falling down into nothingness.<sup>41</sup> It is remarkable that Heidegger reviewed time and space as basic categories of *esse* (being, *Sein*), which in the whole history of Western philosophy history has been ignored in investigating what it is.<sup>42</sup> The “*Sein*” is positioned as a category or concept which remains eternal and exists eternally. But, life is temporary, with moments of up and

<sup>39</sup> Heidegger, M. 1993. *Sein und Zeit*. Tübingen: Niemayer, § 53, 266.

<sup>40</sup> Heidegger, M. 1943. *Was ist Metaphysik?* Freiburg: Klostermann.

<sup>41</sup> Heidegger, M. 1993. *Sein und Zeit*, op. cit., § 53, § 47, § 30.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.* § 1.

down, moving into *Grund* und *Ab-grund*, to the fundamental ground and anti-ground / non-ground.

Death is a forthcoming issue in an unknown future. Life presupposes this possibility, and man resists against the unknown future through the cognition of being and its continuity and consistency.<sup>43</sup> In this structure we see a fundamental difference between Dōgen and Heidegger. Dōgen, as a Buddhist thinker, accepts the dynamic change of time/space in the principle of *anitya* (inconsistency) and dynamic change of being and non-being without relying on any substantiality. Since this dynamic change without a fixation on substantiality is the basic principle of eternal truth in Buddhist philosophy (*dharma*), time is neither a subject nor an object which can be treated in separation from our self. For Dōgen, time is not a category but an indivisible part of our existence as life-and-death. Space is the same, because our bodily existence is spontaneous, a dimensional space in the middle of uncertain dynamically changing phenomena.<sup>44</sup>

This approach to time-space-self without a dualistic objectification between the self and spacetime is basic also in the philosophy of Nishida. One of his main theses, “Contradictory Identity of Time-Space-Self,” is based on the acceptance of what is contradictory as a high-level integration of opposite categories,<sup>45</sup> and has its roots in Buddhist philosophy.

Both Heidegger and Dōgen investigate the same problems: the relationship between life and death, our existence that carries the potential of death, and the confrontation with related problems. The results of my comparative reflections may be summarized as follows: the difference between Dōgen and Heidegger becomes obvious. Viewed from the concept of Dōgen, “life-death” as a dimension of oneness in a real, tangible life, Heidegger positions death at the end of being in time, i.e., as an absolute opposite to being. Even though death at any time will be immanent with regard to being, there is a dual split between being and death.

Even though in Heidegger’s late works *Zeit und Sein* is mentioned,<sup>46</sup> the discourse is nevertheless focused on illuminating time in a firm connection with original being; and therefore clearing and hiding remain in focus of forever present subsistence.

In Dōgen’s thought is differently because of the paramount principle of the Buddhist dynamic of being: *anitya*. What remains ever present is not being, neither non-being nor nothingness, but *anitya*, the constant appearing, lingering,

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., § 62. See also footnote 40.

<sup>44</sup> Dōgen, *shōbō genzō*. This thought is actualized especially in vols. *uji* 有時 (“Time – that is there”) and *zenki* (“The fulfilled moment for actualization of truth”) 全機.

<sup>45</sup> See Nishida, K. 1965. *Complete Works*, vol. 11, Tokyo, 254, 348.

<sup>46</sup> Heidegger, M. 1993., op. cit., Cf. Heidegger, M. 1997. “Der Satz vom Grund,” in: *Complete Works*, op. cit., vol. 10, 153, 156, 161, 166, 169.

and vanishing of this moment (*kshana bhangha*)<sup>47</sup> and all distinctions within it, which exist in space, in their dynamic change from being to non-being. Heidegger uses the term “man” to suggest a controversial, but persistent being destined for death. Man’s being in itself implies the inevitable loss of being; and from that the problem of abstract fear arises. In contrast to this, Dōgen’s conception of life-death, as encompassing being and non-being, is integrated as an indivisible pair of opposites, where even our clearest example of life in actuality expresses the full dimension of life-death. Holding/ retaining (*hajū* 把住 or *hajō* 把定)<sup>48</sup> in Zen recognition is constantly accompanied by the opposite, i.e., releasing/letting go (*hōgyō* 放行).

### 6.3. Life-Death as a Contradictory Unity —an Intelligible Self as the “Corpus”

Thus, for Dōgen it is evident that life and death are the phenomenon coupling two in one,<sup>49</sup> which is inherent in us from our birth to an unknown future. In Buddhist thinking and its culture it is not postulated that we have to keep our *Seinserkenntnis* (cognition of being) as an inherent factor. If we do so, Dōgen warns, it is only half of the phenomena of life: either life or death in dualistic separation.<sup>50</sup> For Dōgen, life-death are coupled, in one word, in every moment, at any time and in any situation. Every moment it emerges, stays and vanishes at the same time. There is nowhere a consistent continuity forever (out of *dharma*. *Dharma* is eternal, but it is embodied and manifested only in a being which is inconsistent). Dōgen thinks that the life moment and the death moment arise always linked to each other, accompanied by our breathing. The linearity of time is not Dōgen’s main issue.<sup>51</sup> Time emerges, stays and vanishes; this coupling goes on forever with mathematical precision. But the time before and after the present is always all in one, just at this moment of here and now. The three-dimensional world passes through present-past-future. Both the wide circle of our past lives in our memory (like Plato’s anamnesis) and the unknown future are visions of our self-consciousness. In Zen thought, the moment of the absolute presence here and now has an absolute existence forever, even if this moment of here and now becomes past and vanishes. This absolute moment of here and now is contradictory, vanishing at every moment and existing at the same time forever in cogni-

<sup>47</sup> *Kshana bhangha*, *setsuna-metsu* 刹那滅, Takasaki, Hayashima, 1994, 261ff.

<sup>48</sup> *Hajō-hōgyō* 把定・放行/*hajū-hōgyō*. 把住・放行. See Iriya, Koga, *Lexicon of the Zen Terminology*, 274. See Inagaki, H. 1991. *A Glossary of Zen Terms*. Kyoto: Nagata bunshōdō.

<sup>49</sup> Dōgen, *shōbō genzō*: This concept is explained in the secret volume (秘密正法眼藏). In: *gendai-yaku*. Nakamura, S. / 禅文化学院 (Ed.) 1993. *shōbō genzō*,... *seishin shobō*.

<sup>50</sup> Even if the originality of the “secret volume” is questionable according to philologists, the basic concept is present also in vol. *zenki* found in the statement: 生也全機現, 死也全機現.

<sup>51</sup> Dōgen, *shōbō genzō*, vol. *uji* 有時.



tion embodied in *dharma*, the universal order of truth. A contradiction seems to be that we, in our limited and inconsistent bodily human existence, strive for cognition embodied in irrefutable truth.

In the acknowledgement and the acceptance of this contradiction in our thinking and acting, we participate in the absolute truth, which is an unlimited truth. In the problem of the life-death contradiction, Dōgen's position also includes this philosophical contradiction: breathing from moment to moment, our life is a dying life, life-death, even if we are in the middle of the living life.

When we live the moment of death, death is not a dying but a living death. The fact of death at the end of life is the completed life, life-death as oneness. This death is not a brief death, falling into nothingness. It is life-death executed in a completed phenomenon. If we see the dualistic phenomena of life against death as two contradictory opposites, we cannot grasp and experience that what *nirvāṇa* means—a deep understanding of the above-mentioned whole truth in bodily existence, in life in the real world and in the intellectual world: life and death as oneness, from our birth onwards, are always in us. This oneness is inherent as a contradictory self-identity of our human self<sup>52</sup>, including the vanishing moment of our life and the completion of life-death in *dharma*, the universal eternal truth. The cognition of life-death as a couple transcends our bodily existence, in the immanence of the world. The deeply inherent/immanent moment of life-death in the phenomena real-life is to be recognized in our careful breathing, aware of what is actually here and now. The highly transcendent identity of life-death in our bodily life is grasped in the intellectual thinking-acting in every activity in life; human life develops in accordance with this contradiction, in completing our own life and our relationships to others day by day.<sup>53</sup> Here the construction of one's own life as an irreversible occasion is described in Zen Buddhism as follows: "Once in encounter, once in a life time". Everything, every occasion day by day is an encounter of our self with things in relation to it. Every occasion can be encountered only once. No experience is the same, because our self and the circumstances are always changing in time and space. Therefore nothing is the same; everything is an encounter made only once in a lifetime. The focus is directed to the centre of the life phenomenon and to the acting / thinking / breathing self as one of the highest dignity.

<sup>52</sup> See Nishida, K., footnote 45.

<sup>53</sup> Dōgen, *shōbō genzō*, the secret volume (秘密正法眼藏), see footnote 46. Hashi, H. 2011. "Transzendenz sive Immanenz—Religionsphilosophische Ansätze im 'Shōbō Genzō' Dōgens." In: Hödl, H., V. Futterknecht. *Religionen nach der Säkularisierung*. Münster– Berlin: LIT.

I call this unit of the self which is responsible for experiencing, recognizing and actualizing truth by the special term: “*corpus*”:<sup>54</sup> 1) the bodily existence as a physical volume, 2) its ability for acknowledging essential truth, 3) its manifestation of recognized truth in relationship with other beings. In view of Plato’s understanding of 1)<sup>x</sup> hedra, 2)<sup>x</sup> topos, 3)<sup>x</sup> xora, this explanation of the “*corpus*” have another reference, continuing the comparative reflections on the philosophy of the global world.<sup>55</sup> The main focus expressed by Plato is to hen (the one) as a being of universal truth. The focus of the *corpus* is also on the oneness of universal truth in real activity, finding the general base of the existence of our self among life and death. The correspondence of points 2) and 2)<sup>x</sup> are consequent in recognizing this main difference. The correspondence of 3) to 3)<sup>x</sup> becomes obvious if we regard the main focus of both, 3) to 3)<sup>x</sup>, in the “recognition of the networks of the various relations of the principles of truth.

Let us summarize the most relevant aspects of this topic:

Life versus death is a constantly changing phenomenon: In overcoming this dualistic struggle the human being achieves transcendence, nirvāna in a world immanency—the calm, transparent insight, the profound dimension of cognition integrated into dying/completing life, as visualized by Dōgen.

In the firm grasping of cognition, “*Erschlossenheit des Daseins*”/the definite clear significance of existence, one has overcome the anxiety of death according to Heidegger, going forward to life in “impassioned freedom” towards the unknown death.<sup>56</sup> This cognition of the phenomeno-logos shows us the *veritas transcendentalis*.<sup>57</sup>

#### **7. COGNITION AS VERITAS TRANSCENDENTALIS OR COGNITION AS CORPUS?—TOWARDS EMBODIED COGNITION IN THE DIALOGUE OF PHILOSOPHIES**

In the above comparison an important question is raised: Do we hold, as does Heidegger, the problem of death to be a prelude to the abyss of nothingness or do we accept Dōgen’s view of a dynamic principle of humanity and all

<sup>54</sup> The term of *corpus*: Hashi, H. 2014. *Philosophische Anthropologie zur globalen Welt*. Berlin: LIT, I.1; idem. 2012. *Kyoto-Schule – Zen – Heidegger*, op. cit., III. 16.

<sup>55</sup> Nishida mentioned this kind of developing philosophy in a possible comparison to Plato and Hegel: Nishida, K. 1965. *Complete Works*, vol. 11, Tokyo 1965, 73. See also Hashi, H. 2005. “Naturerkenntnis und Vernunftkenntnis im 20. Jhd.” In: *intellectus universalis*. Gabriel, W., H. Hashi (Eds.), Wien: Doppelpunkt, 101–103.

<sup>56</sup> Heidegger, M. 1993. *Sein und Zeit*, op. cit., § 53, 266, 311.

“We may now summarize our characterization of authentic Being-towards-Death as we have projected it existentially: anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concerned solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom towards death—a freedom which has been released from the illusions of the ‘they,’ and which is factual, certain of itself, and anxious.”

<sup>57</sup> Heidegger, M. 1993. *Sein und Zeit*, op. cit., § 7, 38; *Being and Time*, 1962, op. cit., 62.

beings within the transparency and tranquility of what can be construed as a single, great action, a single great mind? The problem of *Zeitigung*/temporalizing is important for visualizing the moment of *being-in-the-world* by Heidegger. In Dōgen, “*uji*” (有時) refers to an opposite interpretation: that time is in us and that it passes and disappears from one moment to the next, reflecting our existence here and now. Yet, this moment is always there, enabling us to create and collect manifold *karman*.<sup>58</sup> Both the ways of thinking concentrate on the essence of time: Dōgen urges us to realize the eternal truth to be recognized and actualized through reality, in empirical life; Heidegger thinks in phenomenological terms: “Being is nothing but *transcendens*,” “The transcendence of being is excellent insofar as it allows for the possibility and necessity of the most radical individuation. Any opening up of being as *transcendens* is phenomenological truth as *veritas transcendentalis*.”<sup>59</sup>

### CONCLUSION

The following provisional balance can be struck between the views presented in this article: Dōgen’s principle is how far the real empirical self, by totally accepting and manifesting its true nature, can grasp and embody *dharma* awareness. I call this corpus, a body with the unlimited capability of opening *dharma*, in other words, an insistent and conscious manifestation of our true self in daily life. The consideration of Dōgen’s Zen prompts a re-evaluation of Heidegger’s view insofar as the opening of being-in-the-world does not remain only a *transcendens*, but it also may point to a return of the world immanence to life in the direction of embodied cognition. This will produce a number of opportunities for a dialogue between Buddhist and Western philosophy in our globalized world.

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<sup>58</sup> Cf. Dōgen, *shōbō genzō*, vol. *uji*. H. Hashi, “Transzendenz sive Immanenz,” see footnote 53.

<sup>59</sup> Heidegger, M. 1993. *Sein und Zeit*, op. cit., § 7, see footnote 53. Cf. Hashi, H. 2014. “Cognition Embodied in Buddhist Philosophy.” *Philosophy Study*, vol. 2014/2, New York: David Publishing.

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